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Mnangagwa Failings
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- Written by: John C Burke
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Further Analysis of Mnangagwa’s Policies:
This Article is a continuation of a Question of Talent within Zanu PF and their 'Administration (see previous Article CLICK HERE)
Analysing Emmerson Mnangagwa’s policies as president of Zimbabwe since November 2017 involves examining their intent, implementation, and outcomes across key areas: economic management, governance, infrastructure, agriculture, and foreign relations. The focus here is on their practical impact, drawing from observable results rather than stated goals alone, and situating them within Zimbabwe’s challenging context—marked by decades of decline under Robert Mugabe, international sanctions, and domestic political tensions.
Economic Management
Mnangagwa’s flagship economic policy, encapsulated in the “Zimbabwe is Open for Business” mantra, aimed to attract foreign investment and stabilize the economy post-Mugabe. Key initiatives include:
- Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP, 2018-2020): Led by Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube, this austerity-driven plan sought to cut public spending, remove subsidies, and introduce a new currency (the RTGS dollar, later replaced). It included a controversial 2% tax on electronic transactions to boost revenue. Implementation faltered due to public backlash—fuel price hikes in January 2019 sparked deadly protests—and persistent currency instability. Inflation soared to over 500% by 2020, eroding purchasing power.
- Currency Reforms: The reintroduction of the Zimbabwean dollar in 2019 (abandoning the multi-currency system) and the launch of the gold-backed Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) in April 2024 aimed to curb hyperinflation and black-market trading. While the ZiG has shown early signs of stabilizing exchange rates, public trust remains low due to past currency collapses, and parallel markets persist. Real GDP growth was 8.5% in 2021 (a post-COVID rebound), but it slowed to 3% by 2023, per World Bank estimates, far below the 10% annual target of Mnangagwa’s “Vision 2030” for upper-middle-income status.
- Outcome: Economic policies have failed to deliver sustainable growth or investor confidence. FDI inflows remain negligible (e.g., $340 million in 2022, per UNCTAD), dwarfed by regional peers like Zambia ($1.1 billion). Unemployment exceeds 80% informally, and poverty affects over 70% of the population, per ZimStat 2023 data. Talent in design exists—Ncube’s academic credentials suggest capability—but execution is undermined by corruption and lack of structural reform.
Governance and Political Administration
Mnangagwa promised a break from Mugabe’s authoritarianism, pledging democratic reforms and reconciliation:
Persecution Narratives
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- Written by: Evy Kagandi
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Blessed Mhlanga Still Detained
As of today, March 21, 2025, Blessed Mhlanga has not been released on bail. The High Court, presided over by Justice Gibson Mandaza, denied his bail appeal, upholding the earlier decision by Harare Magistrate Farai Gwatima. Mhlanga, a senior journalist with Heart & Soul TV (HStv) and Alpha Media Holdings (AMH), has been in custody since his arrest on 24th February 2025, facing charges of inciting violence under Section 164 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. These charges stem from his interviews with war veteran Blessed Geza, who criticized President Emmerson Mnangagwa and called for his resignation.
Implications for Journalism in Zimbabwe
The continued detention of Blessed Mhlanga carries significant implications for journalism in Zimbabwe, reflecting broader challenges to press freedom and freedom of expression: 6 key Issues Raised below
- Chilling Effect on Journalists: Mhlanga’s arrest and the denial of bail send a strong message to journalists that covering dissenting voices or politically sensitive topics can lead to severe repercussions. This could foster self-censorship, as media practitioners may avoid reporting on controversial issues to protect themselves from legal harassment or imprisonment.
- Erosion of Press Freedom: Despite constitutional guarantees under Section 61, which protect freedom of expression and media rights, the use of criminal laws to detain journalists undermines these protections. The case highlights a pattern of increasing state intolerance toward independent journalism, particularly since Mnangagwa’s re-election in 2023, as noted by media watchdogs like Reporters Without Borders.
- Criminalization of Journalism: The framing of Mhlanga’s work—interviewing a public figure—as incitement to violence blurs the line between journalistic duty and criminal activity. Media advocates, including the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), have condemned this as an attack on the profession, arguing that journalism is being treated as a terrorist or subversive act rather than a democratic necessity.
- Impact on Public Discourse: By silencing journalists like Mhlanga, the government restricts the flow of information and stifles public debate on critical issues such as governance and economic challenges. This limits citizens’ ability to stay informed and hold leaders accountable, weakening democratic processes.
How Large is the Diaspora
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- Written by: John C Burke
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The Size of the Diaspora – GROK3 Estimation Considerations
Estimating the size of Zimbabwe’s diaspora, particularly the figure of 900,000 often cited from the 2022 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) census, is fraught with challenges due to inconsistent data, the prevalence of informal migration, and the significant role of South Africa’s informal economy. Let’s break this down to assess the accuracy of this estimate and why South Africa’s informal sector alone might suggest a higher number.
ZimStat’s Estimate: 900,000
The ZimStat figure of 908,913 Zimbabweans living abroad, derived from the 2022 census, is based on household reports of relatives living outside the country. Of this, 773,246 were reported in South Africa, with smaller numbers in the UK (23,166), Botswana (40,000), and other nations. This data collection method—relying on family members’ responses—introduces potential undercounting, as it misses undocumented migrants, those who severed ties with home, or whose families underreported for various reasons (e.g., fear of scrutiny). The census provides a structured snapshot but struggles to capture the fluidity and opacity of migration patterns, especially in informal contexts.
South Africa’s Informal Economy and Migration
South Africa hosts the largest share of Zimbabwe’s diaspora due to proximity, historical labor ties, and economic disparities. The informal economy—estimated at 24.9% of South Africa’s GDP, or roughly $240 billion in PPP terms—employs millions, including many undocumented migrants. Zimbabweans, fleeing economic collapse (e.g., 80%+ currency depreciation in 2023) and unemployment (officially 9.3%, likely higher in reality), are drawn to this sector for jobs like street vending, construction, and domestic work, which evade formal registration.
Official South African data from the 2011 census recorded 672,308 Zimbabweans, a number experts consider outdated and conservative given subsequent migration waves, especially post-2017 after Mugabe’s ousting. Estimates from other sources vary wildly:
- The International Organization for Migration (IOM) suggests up to 3 million Zimbabweans in South Africa alone, factoring in undocumented flows.
- Academic and civil society estimates often place the figure between 1-1.5 million, with some outlier claims as high as 15 million (likely exaggerated).
- Posts on X and media anecdotes (e.g., Helen Zille’s 2019 claim of 2 million) reflect public sentiment of a larger presence, though these lack rigorous backing.
The informal economy’s scale—absorbing workers without legal documentation—means many Zimbabweans bypass official counts. For instance, the 2009-2012 Documentation of Zimbabweans Project regularized 245,000, yet many remained outside this framework due to distrust or ineligibility. With South Africa’s total immigrant population estimated at 2.9 million (2020 UN data), of which Zimbabweans are a plurality (24% per 2011 census), a figure exceeding 1 million in South Africa alone aligns with informal sector dynamics.
Electoral Reforms - Member Views
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ELECTORAL REFORMS:
A MUST REQUIREMENT FOR A FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE.
Most Zimbabweans have understood the unfair handling of the Zimbabwe Elections by ZEC (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission), which we now know are designed to keep ZANU PF party in power through a rigging process. Therefore, we call for a substantive electoral reform in Zimbabwe.
ZEC declared the elections (August 2023) free and fair despite overwhelming evidence of rigged process, making it clear the reality that it is not a neutral organisation. The organisation is controlled by ZANU PF party.
Election Observers 2023 Final report of the Commonwealth highlighted some flaws in what they witnessed in the following statements;
- Observers witnessed tables set up in close proximity to some polling stations in Harare and Bulawayo cities by an organisation called Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ),
- and received reports that members of the organisation were allegedly recording the names and ID of voters.
- They also noted that members of FAZ were conducting citizen observation.
- Their presence fuelled allegations of voter intimidation, since, FAZ is associated with ZANU PF.
They also noted that all three ballot boxes were similar in appearance, which may have caused confusion for voters when trying to drop ballot papers in the right boxes. To assist voters in the voting process and to avoid misplaced ballot papers, ballot boxes should be different colours, corresponding to the colour of the ballot papers.
They observed, in some areas particularly Harare and Bulawayo the polling process started late. In a few instances, ballot papers were not delivered until the afternoon, with one case experiencing delays up to 19:30hrs. These delays could have influenced voter turn out, especially in these densely populated urban areas, and may have caused frustration among voters.
ZANU PF party members and their party president, ED Mnangagwa, are always telling the public on their refusal to agree on reforms, "we can't agree to reform our ourselves out of power." they boast/tease. ZANU PF party's refusal to do the right thing is noted in the 2018 Zimbabwe COG Report recommendations;
- Total recommendations 54.
- Not implemented 27.
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